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COMMENTARY
he phrase "client control"-as in
"what kind of client control do you
ave to ttle this?"-is familiar to
litigators. Although the expression sounds
patronizing, there are times when a client
insists on doing what is stupid, wrong, or
unlawful. At these times, counsel's ability
to influence the client becomes important.
When a client does not listen, counsel
must often choose whether to help pilot
the wayward ship to lessen anticipated
damage, or row ashore and leave the ves-
sel to its perilous fate.
Sometimes, lack of client control re-
quires counsel to leave the boat forthwith,
e.g., plans to commit criminal acts, de-
mands that spurious lawsuits be filed, po-
sitions taken, courts misled, or the legal
process otherwise abused. California's
Rules of Professional Conduct command
the withdrawal of counsel where a client is
litigating without probable cause, or where
continued employment will result in a vio-
lation of the rules or the State Bar Act.
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In turn, the State Bar Act's "duties of
an attorney" include "to counsel or main-
tain such actions, proceedings, or defenses
only as appear to him or her legal or just
(except in defense of accused criminals). ' 2
And another enumerated duty is "to em-
ploy, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him or her such means
only as are consistent with truth, and never
to seek to mislead the judge...by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law."
3
Beyond mandatory withdrawal, coun-
sel may withdraw where a client seeks to
pursue an unlawful course of action, in-
sists upon making a claim or argument
that is "not warranted," or even acts con-
trary to the advice of counsel (even if not
prohibited by the rules or the Act).4
Arguably, an attorney advising an
agency has a heightened obligation. First,
agency counsel has duties flowing from
Rule of Professional Conduct 3-600 gov-
erning representation of an "organization."
The organization itself-not factions of
it-is the client. Where the organization
seeks to violate the law, the rule spells out
duties to seek reconsideration, to appeal
the matter to higher authority within the
entity, and finally to resign "in accordance
with rule 3-700."
There are other reasons why an agen-
cy's counsel may have special obligations.
Groups do not necessarily exercise more
prudent judgment than do individuals. Far
from moderating excesses, group dynamics
can often stimulate excesses-whether a
gang, nation, political party, trade associ-
ation, or other assemblage. Our species is
particularly dangerous in groups.
The danger of abuse by an agency ex-
ceeds other human groupings because it
wields state police powers. Most agencies
have the authority to determine who may
practice, or continue to practice, the trade
or profession which may be the life goal
of an individual.
Adding further to the obligation is the
nature of the agency-advising counsel.
They generally are not private attorneys
who depend upon the attraction and reten-
tion of clients, but are public employees
paid a salary, usually from an office of
county counsel or city attorney for major
local jurisdictions. At the state level, the
37 agencies within the Department of Con-
sumer Affairs are advised by the Depart-
ment's hired attorneys, and these agen-
cies (and most others) are also advised by
attorneys from the Attorney's General's
Office.
The Attorney General's Office is cer-
tainly the repository of the highest obli-
gation to comply with the standards of
the Rules of Professional Conduct and
the State Bar Act. Deputy attorneys gen-
eral do not solely represent public agen-
cies; they advise them on behalf of the
People of the State, as officers of the State.
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However, in the past twenty years, the
Attorney General's Office has publicly
withdrawn as an agency's counsel in only
four known situations, most of which in-
volved a political or policy-related objec-
tion of the Attorney General personally.
Critics of state and local agencies are
often bewildered by the failure of coun-
sel to "just say no" to agencies insisting
on violations of law. Critics contend that
violative behavior, while not prevalent,
is also not rare.
Since 1987, the Office of Administra-
tive Law has reviewed 104 complaints of
alleged "underground rulemaking," allega-
tions that a state agency unlawfully adopt-
ed a "rule" without legally required due
process, including notice, an opportunity
for public comment, hearing, review for
necessity, clarity, authority, etc., or even
publication in the California Code of Reg-
ulations. It has determined that 87 were un-
lawfully created. 5 Where was counsel?
Certainly a substantial number of agen-
cy decisions are close questions. But where
the agency is moving against clear legis-
lative intent and/or common decency, what
should counsel do? How often has agency
counsel advised against the commission of
an unlawful or improper act? How often
has counsel resigned from further represen-
tation of an agency under Rule 3-700 as a
result of a failure to follow proper advice?
In 1986, the Center for Public Interest
Law was approached by 32 Vietnamese
physicians who had emigrated to Califor-
nia and had been denied licenses by the
Medical Board, although they had passed
all examinations and completed all post-
graduate training requirements. An inves-
tigation disclosed that the agency had met
unlawfully in private, and decided to sus-
pend the licensing of Vietnamese physi-
cians without explaining why and without
justification. Two years of devastating ca-
reer interruption, deceit from agency offi-
cials, and bureaucratic stonewalling ensued
before licenses were finally issued.Y Where
was agency counsel during the process?
For years, the Board of Accountancy
has been permitting a committee of private
practitioners to decide disciplinary cases
against colleagues and competitors. A
challenge to this practice, which is obvi-
ously unlawful, 7 yielded defensiveness
from the Board and indifference from its
counsel. Why have counsel from both the
Department of Consumer Affairs and the
Attorney General's Office been advising
the agency consistent with its ambitions,
but contrary to basic legal principles?
Some state boards decided that the
Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act should
have a loophole allowing committees to
meet privately so long as they consist of
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"less than a quorum" of the board. In fact,
the Act very clearly states and intends that
a board committee of more than two mem-
bers must meet in public. However, the At-
torney General wrote informal opinion let-
ters supporting the boards' position at the
urging of agency clients, managed to get
part of one such letter into a court's dicta
(in an inapplicable case interpreting a dif-
ferent statute), and then cited that dicta as
a holding in subsequent litigation.8 Here,
deputy attorneys general self-created a
basis to undermine one of California's
"sunshine" statutes-until an appellate
court called them on it and noted that it
would "decline...to join this circle of
error."
9
In these cases, and in others, there has
been a failure to comply with the Rules of
Professional Conduct and a failure of ac-
countability. Few if any attorneys have
ever been fined, sanctioned, demoted, or
even publicly criticized for advising an
agency to go ahead with an unlawful or
unfair act. Needless to say, none has ever
been sanctioned for failing to resign under
the obligation of Rule 3-700(B).
One dynamic that may be at the heart
of the failure to understand the proper role
of public counsel to an agency is the "hired
gun," "adversarial process" training re-
ceived by attorneys in law school and rep-
licated to excess in civil litigation. School-
ed in the relativism of the Socratic method
(there is no perfect answer; all have flaws),
attorneys are taught that law is a game of
one flawed argument juxtaposed against
another flawed argument, and that both
sides advocate to a neutral third party-
who alone has the responsibility to find the
correct answer.
Add to this mentality a desire to win
the approval of the group one is advis-
ing, and you have a recipe for the classic
"enabler"--decried by critics as the cur-
rent norm in public agency representa-
tion. The "enabler" does not look with
neutrality at the statutes which may be
implicated in an agency action, does not
attempt to ascertain the legislative intent
at issue, is rarely tuned to concepts of
fairness for outsiders. Instead, he or she
views the agency client as seeking an end
the agency determines; counsel's role is
to use legal skills to help the agency
achieve that end. Such a goal involves
reading statutes contrary to legislative
intent, finding loopholes, making sup-
portive arguments-in essence, serving
the agency by helping it do whatever it
wants to do. Where advice is not followed,
counsel nevertheless remains loyal, at-
tempts to mitigate harm, and publicly de-
fends the agency's position, using every
argument and artifice available.
Many attorneys who advise agencies
have a problem walking the line between
a properly subsidiary role to serve a client
and informing the agency when its plans
breach larger obligations the agency must
follow. Counsel must attempt to consider
the agency's plans apart from the agency,
its territory, and its ambitions, and look at
what it is doing in light of legitimate com-
peting policies and laws.
One way to do this is to make the ar-
gument from the opposite side. If, looking
at the situation from the viewpoint of an-
other legitimate interest, the direction un-
dertaken is unlawful or simply abusive of
higher values, the agency should be so ad-
vised. If the actions are unlawful and the
advice is ignored, counsel must withdraw.
This can be done politely, deferentially, or
regretfully, but-regardless of its historical
rarity-counsel is obligated to withdraw. If
the action is lawful and not subject to man-
datory withdrawal, but abusive of other
higher values, counsel should consider
withdrawal under the permissive provi-
sion of the rules.
Once a decision has been made to with-
draw, there is a duty to mitigate harm that
may occur from counsel's departure. Turn-
ing over files to alternate counsel, meeting
approaching deadlines, and maintaining
client confidences may be involved. Even
here there may be limitations on assistance
when the agency is pursuing an unlawful
path. And it is proper to notify substitute
counsel of the reason for withdrawal, en-
abling him or her to make a similar con-
scientious decision.
The Rules of Professional Conduct and
the State Bar Act do not define lawyers as
a profession of hired guns. The adversary
process serves the higher end of truth-seek-
ing; it is not the end itself. And the adver-
sary process is-in particular-not an ab-
solute shelter for public counsel who rep-
resent interests beyond the agency client.
Members of the State Bar are under-
standably defensive about the negative
public image of attorneys. We do not un-
derstand how we are so condemned when
all we are doing is professionally serving
our clients. Critics argue, with some per-
suasive force, that we will be thought of
more positively when we internalize a
more sophisticated hierarchy of values, one
placing compliance with the law, civility,
and human kindness on a footing a step
above the adversary game we have exag-
gerated into a self-caricature. Certainly the
attorneys in a position to begin such a re-
naissance are those advising agencies:
Their clients are capable of much damage
if operating outside the law's bona fide in-
tent. These attomeys are in a position to
take a stand without serious individual
sacrifice, and they have clear obligations
even as counsel beyond their facial cli-
ent-to the taxpayers and the body pol-
itic who create their position, pay them,
and trust them to represent more than the
territorial proclivities of an agency.
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